Iraq and the Role of the Big Powers

The following is the final part in the series on the role played by the imperialist powers, primarily Britain and the U.S., in Iraq during the past century.

Part 5: 1992-2002

The terms of the ceasefire and the rigorous requirements imposed on Iraq at the end of the 1991 Gulf War, set out in U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, have remained in effect up until the present. The key conditions were the prohibition on and destruction of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them, coupled with the continuation of economic sanctions. The sanctions, originally imposed to force Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, were now to remain in place until Iraq had complied with the weapons provisions.

Although Resolution 687 makes clear the precise requirements for sanctions to be ended, successive U.S. administrations have consistently moved the goalposts. Among other criteria U.S. officials have asserted that sanctions would remain in effect until Saddam Hussein was removed from power, until human rights were guaranteed, until all Kuwaiti prisoners were returned, or even "until the end of time". As Phyllis Bennis of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington has pointed out, changing "U.S. demands derailed any incentive for Iraq to comply with the weapons requirements and instead signaled Baghdad that regardless of its compliance, Washington would not allow the sanctions to be lifted."(1)

The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) weapons inspectors entered Iraq in 1991. Joined by inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) they remained there until December 1998. Despite disagreements with Iraqi officials who restricted access to some sites, the inspectors succeeded in locating and destroying the majority of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. In 1997 they reported that Iraq's nuclear stocks and capacity were gone and most of its long-range missile delivery systems had been destroyed. There had also been extensive destruction of chemical and biological weaponry.

Based on these reports a split developed in the U.N. Security Council. France and Russia recommended easing sanctions, but the U.S. and Britain refused to consider such a move. In 1997 evidence emerged that the U.S., and possibly Israel, had been receiving intelligence information gathered in Iraq in the course of the inspections. These revelations gave credence to Iraq's protests that the inspections were infringing on its sovereignty. Over the next year the inspections continued in an increasingly acrimonious atmosphere, with the inspectors complaining of Iraqi non-cooperation and eventually withdrawing altogether in December 1998.

The same month, President Clinton authorized what became known as Operation Desert Fox. Over four days the U.S. and Britain unleashed a heavy bombing campaign of alleged weapons sites throughout central and southern Iraq. These attacks were undertaken unilaterally, without U.N. authorization. Indeed, this followed the pattern adopted by the Americans and British throughout the 1990s when they regularly took military action in the name of enforcing U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iraq without U.N. approval.

This had begun with the U.S. and Britain designating no-fly zones in the north and south of the country in 1991 and 1992. The two powers took it upon themselves to police these zones, periodically attacking Iraqi anti-aircraft sites on the ground and bombing selected targets. Following Desert Fox American and British attacks in the no-fly zones increased dramatically, frequently hitting the civilian population as well as military targets. In 1999 the Security Council created a new arms monitoring body for Iraq - UNMOVIC, headed by Hans Blix. However, Iraq did not allow inspectors back into the country until November 2002.

Meanwhile, throughout the decade comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq had remained in place, with devastating consequences for the Iraqi people, not to mention the country's economy and infrastructure. The definition of humanitarian goods to be excluded from the embargo was unclear, and the U.S. in particular sought to limit the definition as much as possible on the grounds that "dual-use" items might be included. A 1998 UNICEF survey found that mortality rates for Iraqi children under five years of age had doubled in the previous decade. In March 1999 the Security Council Panel on Humanitarian Issues concluded: "Even if not all suffering in Iraq can be imputed to external factors, especially sanctions, the Iraqi people would not be undergoing such deprivations in the absence of the prolonged measures imposed by the Security Council and the effects of war." (2)

In recognition of the damaging consequences of sanctions on the Iraqi people and in an effort to block French and Russian efforts to get the sanctions lifted altogether, in 1996 the U.S. and Britain introduced Security Council Resolution 986. This established the Oil-for-Food program under which Iraq could sell specified amounts of oil with the proceeds being deposited in a U.N. account outside the country. The money was then used to purchase humanitarian goods ordered by the Iraqi government. The U.S. and Britain have often portrayed this program as a vast relief effort and attempt to restore the Iraqi economy, but in reality it was a stopgap measure intended to sustain the sanctions while allowing more humanitarian goods into Iraq.

However, by 2001 the sanctions were disintegrating. Companies from various countries, including France, Russia and China, were being awarded huge U.N. approved contracts to sell goods to Iraq under the Oil-for-Food program. In addition, most of Iraq's neighbours were involved in sanctions-busting trade with Baghdad, providing significant revenues to the Iraqi regime. Washington was well aware of this illicit trade but was not able or willing to stop it, especially as some of its key allies in the region - including Jordan and Turkey - were involved. While turning a blind eye to their activities, the Americans were harshly critical of Iran and Syria. However, the U.S. backed down from plans to debate Syrian smuggling in the Security Council when France insisted on discussing Turkish smuggling as well.

In the face of increasing international non-cooperation and opposition to maintaining sanctions, the U.S. and Britain began to switch their focus to the issue of forcing regime change in Iraq. Although not official American policy during the Bush Snr. and Clinton administrations, this position was not new. The argument then had been that since Saddam Hussein was not expected to meet the weapons requirements, sanctions would remain in place indefinitely or until his regime collapsed. In March 1997 Secretary of State Madeline Albright said that the U.S. would support sanctions "as long as it takes" to usher in a "successor regime" that would comply with U.N. resolutions. (3)

When George W. Bush came to power in 2000 his administration included people who had long supported regime change not just for Iraq but for any country that did not support their vision of a new world order. This was a world in which overwhelming American military power would be used to preserve and impose U.S. dictate worldwide in defence of American interests. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11 this emerged as the so-called Bush Doctrine. And Iraq was to be the first test case of the doctrine's implementation.

(1) Phyllis Bennis, "And They Called It Peace: U.S. Policy on Iraq". Middle East Report, 215. Summer 2000. www.merip.org/mer/mer215/215_bennis.html

(2) Quoted in Sarah Graham-Brown and Chris Toensig, "Why Another War? A Backgrounder on the Iraq Crisis". Second Edition. Middle East Research and Information Project. December 2002.

(3) Ibid.