IAEA Meeting on Nuclear Fuel Supply and
Non-Proliferation
From September 19-21, 2006, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) held a Special Event in Vienna on: "Assurances of Nuclear Supply
and Non-Proliferation." More than
300 participants from 61 countries and organizations attended. Charles Curtis,
chairman of the meeting, described its purpose as being to: 1) discuss the
possible expanded use of nuclear energy as a solution to increasing global
demands for energy, and 2) find ways to minimize the risks created by further
spread of sensitive nuclear technology such as uranium enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing.
According to Curtis, discussion was to focus on one main proposal: the
establishment of an independent, non-political, and non-discriminatory back-up
mechanism to ensure supply of nuclear reactor fuel to states that voluntarily
choose to rely on international fuel rather than developing their own
capabilities. This would ensure fuel supply for commercial use in the event of
a politically-motivated interruption. It would not interfere with the existing
commercial market in nuclear fuels, nor would it deal with supply disruption
due to commercial, technical, or other non-political causes.
Those supporting such a mechanism argued that it would eliminate two
main obstacles to the use of nuclear energy to solve the energy crisis. First,
it would offer security to countries reluctant to embark on commercial
nuclear-power programs, using international fuel supplies, for fear of supply
interruptions because of political conflicts. Secondly, it would lessen some of
the pressures that drive vulnerable states to develop their own national
enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.
Under the proposal, a
state using such a back-up mechanism would not lose its rights, guaranteed in
Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to develop research,
production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and to facilitate
and participate in the fullest-possible exchange of equipment, materials, and
scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy. However, this is
misleading because, in fact, all the IAEA proposals put forward
in preparation for the meeting contained recommendations that impinge on
states’ Article IV rights.
The
This was reflected in
several specific proposals presented at the meeting including:
• "Concept for a
Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel", jointly
drafted by France, Germany, Netherlands, Russia, Britain, and the U.S.
(six-nation proposal), recommending that a state only be eligible to use the
back-up mechanism if it has implemented the extra safeguards under the
Additional Protocol, has no exceptional safeguards implementation issues
outstanding with the IAEA, and has chosen not to pursue sensitive fuel cycle
activities;
• World Nuclear Association
proposal - "Ensuring Security of Supply in the International Nuclear Fuel
Cycle" - drafted by nuclear industry experts and the world's four leading
uranium enrichment companies and proposing that to be eligible to use the
back-up mechanism "a customer state must have made a commitment to forego
the development of, or the building or operation of, enrichment
facilities;"
• Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership, announced by the U.S. government and based on the premise that the
U.S. and its international partners would develop a fuel services program to
supply developing nations with access to nuclear fuel in exchange for a
commitment to forego the development of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing
technologies;
• Nuclear Threat Initiative
proposal, which announced that it would donate $50 million to the IAEA to help
create a low-enriched uranium stockpile; this stockpile would be available as a
last-resort fuel reserve for nations that have made the "choice" to
have no indigenous enrichment facilities.
None of these proposals would guarantee a backup supply of nuclear fuel
to recipient states. Furthermore, even if a recipient state agreed to forego
the development of enrichment processing and agreed to the more intrusive
supervision of its nuclear program through the Additional Protocol, the major
powers still have sufficient political, economic, financial and military weight
in the world to pressure many states in international organizations like the
IAEA and on the United Nations Security Council to support measures depriving
other countries of access to nuclear fuel. For example, there is no evidence
that Iran's nuclear program has any military dimension but the U.S. has still
been able to get resolutions through the IAEA and Security Council which
declare that Iran is
"non-compliant" with the NPT. According to these
proposals, Iran would not qualify to use
the backup supply mechanism.
A further controversy arose at the meeting among countries with
advanced nuclear industries over the issue of access to export markets. The
six-nation proposal put forward by France, Germany, Netherlands, Russia,
Britain and the U. S. divided states into suppliers (i.e., those that currently
export nuclear fuel) and recipients. A number of states within the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, such as Japan, Australia, Canada and Brazil, are not currently
exporters of nuclear fuel but consider it within their right to do so. These
countries are concerned that they will be thrown into the recipient category
and denied the opportunity to export nuclear fuel. As a result Japan tabled its
own paper entitled "IAEA Standby Arrangements System for the Assurance of
Nuclear Fuel Supply," which recommended that a back-up supply system
should “make it possible for as many states as practicable to participate in
and contribute to the system ….”
The nuclear-weapons states and their allies are not opposed in
principle to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapon technology.
They actively support proliferation wherever it serves their strategic
interests, and oppose it when it does not. Last month, for example, the U.S.,
along with Britain and France, refused to attend the signing of a treaty that
set up a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. Under the treaty,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan agreed not to
produce, buy, or allow the deployment of nuclear weapons on their soil. The
Americans oppose the treaty because they want the option of deploying nuclear
weapons in this region in the future. In the Middle East, the U.S. opposes the
establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone because its ally Israel would have
to destroy its nuclear-weapon arsenal.
The Special Event did not reach any firm conclusions except to say that further detailed study was required in order to put together a recommendation for the establishment of a back-up nuclear fuel supply mechanism. However it is clear that the meeting was primarily a forum for the nuclear-weapon states, and other states with advanced nuclear technology, to push forward their own military and commercial agendas.