U.S.
Senate Approves Indo-U.S. Nuclear Pact
On November 16 the U.S. Senate approved the U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act by a vote of 85-12. This legislation establishes an India-specific exception to a U.S. law that bans nuclear trade with countries that have not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In doing so, it reverses a 30-year old American policy of denying nuclear materials and equipment to India, which was prompted by India's first nuclear weapons test in 1974. In July 2005, an agreement in principle was reached between U.S. President George Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, giving India access to U.S. nuclear fuel and reactors in return for a pledge to open its civilian nuclear facilities to international inspections. India's eight military plants will be excluded.
Although the Indian government has given a
commitment that any nuclear technology obtained from abroad will only be used
for civilian purposes and that such nuclear reactors will be open to inspection
by international agencies, it still wants to refrain from opening its entire
nuclear program to scrutiny. The Indian government maintains that India's
record as a "responsible democratic nation" should be enough for the
international community to allow it this nuclear exception.
The significance of this agreement and legislation
goes far beyond the sharing of civilian nuclear technology between the two
countries. Cementing its ties with the Indian ruling class and bringing India,
a big power in Asia, into its orbit is all part of the of U.S. imperialist
strategy of extending its domination over Asia as part of its drive to dominate
the world. By offering India the enticement of lifting restrictions on the
supply of nuclear fuel, reactors and related technology, the U.S. is hoping to
lure India away from developing any strategic economic, political or military
alliances and relations with Iran, China and Russia. This will also further
enable the U.S. to manipulate India and Pakistan, by playing one off against
the other, to advance its own interests in that region. In addition, the
agreement will give American companies an edge over their competition in the
Indian nuclear market.
President Bush praised the Senate action
saying: "The United States and India enjoy a strategic partnership based
upon common values. Today, the Senate has acted to further strengthen this
relationship by passing legislation that will deliver energy, non-proliferation
and trade benefits to the citizens of two great democracies." The
U.S.-India Business Council of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce also applauded
Senate support for the bill. Ron Somers, president of the council, which is
comprised of the top 220 American companies doing business in India, stated
that India's nuclear energy market, estimated to require $100 billion in
foreign direct investment, will now be open for American companies.
The impact of this impending deal on India's
foreign policy has been apparent since the president and the prime minister met
in July 2005. First, India suddenly turned against Iran and voted for a
U.S.-backed International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolution on September
24, that falsely condemned Iran for not complying with the NPT. Second, the
multi-billion-dollar, 25-year natural gas agreement, signed in January 2005
between India and Iran, which the Americans oppose, hit a snag over pricing.
The gas deal, however, brought India into confrontation with the United
States, especially over American oil-related sanctions against Iran under the
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. While China, Russia and the European
powers have circumvented the American ban on oil-related investment in Iran,
India is in a more disadvantageous position. In a candid statement to the
Washington Post by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh during his July 2005 visit to the United States he admitted: "I
don't know if any international consortium of bankers would probably underwrite
this." In short, India is yet to reach a stage where it can defy
international financial pressure, especially from the U.S.
There are a number of steps that have to be
taken before the U.S.-India nuclear co-operation agreement can come into
effect. Differences between the Senate bill and a version passed by the House
of Representatives have to be reconciled before a final bill is sent to the
president for his signature. The agreement also needs the approval of the
45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG) that controls global nuclear trade.
However, this is really just a formality as the NSG guidelines regulating the
export of nuclear materials and equipment are voluntary and not enshrined in
any international treaty. In addition, the U.S. and India still have to
negotiate the specific technical details of the agreement, which, in turn, will
then have to be approved by the U.S. Congress.
Also, India still has to negotiate a
safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Whatever spin the U.S., India and the
Director General of the IAEA put on this issue the agreement is bound to
further discredit the NPT non-proliferation regime. The dilemma for the IAEA is
whether it offers India an agreement with terms given to a nuclear-weapon state
or the terms given to a non-nuclear-weapon state. Since the NPT only recognizes
five nuclear-weapon states, and India is not one of them, the U.S.-India plan
would see the IAEA apply the standards reserved for a nuclear-weapon state to
India without recognizing it as a nuclear-weapon state. The only alternatives
are to revise the NPT to officially recognize India as a nuclear-weapon state
or for India to destroy its nuclear weapons in order to qualify as a
non-nuclear-weapon state. Of course, neither of these alternatives are really
options.
The joint statement issued by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh in July is explicit about the kind of safeguard agreement they have in mind for India. It said that India is willing "to assume the same responsibilities and practices...as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States." The distinguishing feature of such an agreement is that it is voluntary and the materials and facilities falling within the scope of the agreement are chosen by the "nuclear weapon" state, and can be withdrawn by the "nuclear-weapon" state at any time. This is very different from the safeguards agreements that other states like Iran are subject to today as "non-nuclear-weapon" states. They are required to put all of their nuclear facilities under IAEA scrutiny which India will not do.